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Abstract 
The challenges posed by both manmade and natural crises require flexible and rapid 
responses from policy-makers. However, the inherent uncertainty of these situations makes 
them vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse. Consequently, contracts awarded during crises 
would often be deemed unsuitable during ordinary times. The occupations of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s (Recovery Act) efforts after the 
most recent financial crisis, and the government’s responses to natural disasters since this 
century began have all involved high-profile incidents of crisis contracting. Governmental 
efforts to improve transparency and oversight regarding these contract awards have been 
admirable, but they are limited in their ability to maintain and proliferate lessons learned. This 
project addresses that problem by creating a crisis-funded contract dataset to test best 
practices across different domains and enhance data transparency for future practitioners 
and researchers. 
Introduction 
Contracting during a crisis is replete with challenges. Delays mean urgent needs go 
unmet, so speed and flexibility are essential. Additionally, uncertainty is commonplace, 
whether the crisis is prompted by natural disasters, military conflicts, or economic 
disturbances. Such crises are vulnerable to the infamous trifecta of waste, fraud, and abuse. 
Even setting those extremes aside, many justifiable crisis contracts cannot or should not be 
sustained in ordinary times.  
This century has already seen a range of high-profile crisis contracting, including for 
military overseas contingencies, disaster response, and economic stimulus. These cases 




1 This report builds on work made possible by the generous support of the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Acquisition Research Program under Grant No. N00244-16-1-0008. The authors would also 
like to thank Kaitlyn Johnson, Ravi Maddali, Robert Karlen, Maura McQuade, and Arwen McNierney, 
as well as the public servants who shared insights, including those who provided feedback to us at a 
prior Acquisition Research Symposium. 
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and for the federal government generally. Important work has been done to provide 
oversight and transparency by the Government Accountability and Transparency Board, the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting, inspectors general (IGs), and others. However, when 
policy-maker attention moves on to a new set of crises and the final reports are filed, 
lessons identified in one domain might not be recognized in another. Moreover, as attention 
fades away, the increasing difficulty of determining whether recommendations were followed 
and whether they succeeded in mitigating preexisting risks produces a real threat of 
backsliding into approaches associated with prior problems. 
Scope 
This project considers crisis-funded contracting for Department of Defense (DoD) 
contingencies. It also reviews studies of civilian efforts, such as the Recovery Act and 
disaster response efforts, because concerns about crisis contracting apply across domains. 
For the military, the focus is on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funded contracting 
that occurred after the initial withdrawal from Iraq, a period of reduced scrutiny relative to the 
pre-withdrawal years that nonetheless benefited from efforts by the DoD to improve data 
transparency. The three categories of crisis contracting studied in this paper are  
• Contingency operations, with a focus on OCO-funded contracting that 
occurred after the initial withdrawal from Iraq. This situation is also 
comparatively understudied—in no small part because of the opaqueness 
and ambiguity surrounding the OCO budget. 
• Contracts paid for by the Recovery Act, which started in 2009 and continues 
thereafter, though the bulk of the spending takes place in the first two years. 
This data had been collected through recovery.gov, which is no longer 
operational, and is also reported through the FPDS website (General 
Services Administration [GSA], 2019). 
• Contracts supporting natural disaster responses that are captured by the 
National Interest Action Code in the period between 2005 and 2016. The first 
disaster coded in this dataset is Hurricane Katrina. Note that grants make up 
the bulk of many disaster responses, but this paper is exclusively focused on 
contracts. 
Plan of the Paper 
Because earlier iterations of this work have been presented at a past Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) conference, this paper focuses on new results and summarizes 
material that has already been presented. The Background and Literature Review briefly 
overviews past research on crisis contracting as well as the regulatory environment for these 
contracts. The Hypotheses section lays out three possibilities on which contracting 
approaches aggravate or mitigate the risks inherent in crisis contracting. The hypotheses 
focus on three areas where the literature review indicates that crisis contracting diverges 
from conventional contracting: noncompetitive awards, undefinitized contract actions, and 
reach-back contracts. The Data and Methods section discusses the challenges and 
contradictions in the labeling of crisis contracts that make identifying OCO-funded contracts 
particularly difficult. It also introduces the logistical regression model employed by the paper.  
After describing the creation of the datasets and model, the paper then proceeds to 
the Results section, which describes trends in crisis-contracting in the datasets and the 
results of the model. The Discussion and Conclusion section analyzes these results and 
evaluates whether they support or refute the paper’s hypotheses before drawing out larger 
implications.  
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Background and Literature Review 
Contingency Contracting 
Contingency contracting has been defined as “direct contracting support to tactical 
and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and Military 
Operations Other Than War, both domestic and overseas. It includes Major Regional 
Conflicts, Lesser Regional Conflicts, Military Operations Other Than War, and Domestic 
Disaster/Emergency Relief.” In addition, this paper includes humanitarian and peacekeeping 
operations in this category. 
Regulatory Environment 
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) mandates that federal 
procurements involve full and open competition, but also stipulates exemptions that allow 
contracting officers to engage in noncompetitive procurement during “urgent and 
compelling” situations. Additionally, these contingency contracts enjoy exemptions that allow 
them to start faster. For example, if a losing vendor protests the outcome of a competition, a 
contingency contract does not have to wait until the protest is resolved to start. In addition, 
contingency contracts are more able to employ undefinitized contract awards, which allow 
starting work before all the details of payment are in place. 
Despite the range of regulatory exemptions, aspects of crisis contracting face 
heightened scrutiny. The crisis contract durations are often quite limited to minimize the 
amount of time the government is committed to expedited deals. Whether such restrictions 
should be further institutionalized is currently in dispute. Proposed reforms have sought to 
limit contingency contracts by default, but opponents contend that shorter contingency 
contracts are not necessarily better. 
Negative Outcomes of Crisis Contracting 
The urgency that inevitably surrounds crisis contracting provides opportunities for 
waste, fraud, and abuse because contracting officers are unable to obtain information parity 
with vendors before funds are dispersed. After Hurricane Katrina, hotels contracted to house 
the affected sent invoices to relevant contracting officers before the latter could confirm the 
contract terms. Information asymmetry regarding contractor performance can then extend 
over the life of these contracts. Moreover, crisis funding for natural disasters can lead to 
increased levels of incomplete documentation, a lack of contract closeouts, and higher level 
reviews that do not happen or are insufficiently documented. Insufficient documentation 
leaves the process vulnerable to fraud throughout. 
Aggravating or Mitigating Factors 
Noncompetitive Awards—The ability to bypass competition when awarding contracts 
due to urgency is an important aspect of contingency contracting because competition can 
lead to delays. For contingency contracting, delays can undermine mission efficiency, 
regarding both meeting the urgent needs of disaster-affected populations and the 
effectiveness of responders. Noncompetitive contracts that use the urgency exception are 
limited to only one year to reduce the risk of overspending, but the relative cost and benefits 
of shorter contracts are disputed. In addition to the risk of higher prices and lower quality 
products or services, noncompetitive contracts are also at greater risk of misconduct when 
compared to ones awarded through the standard procurement process.  
Undefinitized Contract Actions—Undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) allow 
production to start without defining all of the terms of the contract. These contracts can be 
advantageous because they allow for the immediate production and allocation of critically 
needed goods or services. Unfortunately, UCAs increase the risk of overpaying for goods 
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and services, and of making the contracting officer beholden to the vendor. In disaster relief 
contracting, they carry an even higher risk of cost overruns than when UCAs are used in 
ordinary times. Entering into a UCA through a noncompetitive award exacerbates these 
challenges.  
Reach-Back Contracting—Reach-back contracting allows contracting officers in the 
field to “reach-back” to domestic contracting officers for support in contingency operations. It 
shifts the workload back to domestic contracting offices, which can result in fewer deployed 
contracting officers. With reduced deployments, the risks and costs associated with 
transportation and hazardous duty pay also decline. By utilizing reach-back methods, 
contracting officers can improve their strategic buying and develop greater expertise within 
their source selection. Furthermore, reach-back contracting facilitates continuity to workflow 
management and increased standardization for contingency contract reporting. 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
This paper is motivated by the high-risk nature of crisis-funded contracting. The 
research question focuses on U.S. federal contracting because of the range of U.S. crisis-
funded activities and the wealth of available data.  
How do crisis-funded contracting approaches employed by the U.S. federal 
government correlate with performance indicators? 
The largest number of U.S. federal crisis-funded transactions relate specifically to 
Overseas Contracting Operation, but disaster-related and Recovery act acquisition are also 
included because the risks of urgent acquisition are not limited to the military context. 
Dealing with recovery from ecological or economic challenges also has the advantage of 
being more relevant to the private sector as well as state and local governments.  
To answer this question, the study team had to create a crisis-funded contract 
dataset consisting of transactions that have been labeled as supporting OCO, the Recovery 
Act, or disaster recovery. This dataset was then supplemented by identifying unlabeled 
OCO activity after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq based on budgetary data, regulatory 
restrictions, and similarity to labeled OCO transactions. To achieve both steps, the study 
team employed a decision. This paper focused the identification work on OCO contracting 
after the Iraq war for three reasons. First, the wartime period has already been subject to 
greater scrutiny, including the Commission on Wartime Contracting. Second, the study team 
identified a significant gap between OCO budgets and the level of labeled contingency 
contracting activity, suggesting that there was much work to be done. Third, starting in 2012, 
contract-level budget account labeling was reliably available in FPDS, which facilitates the 
labeling process. The study team has not attempted to identify unlabeled Recovery Act or 
disaster contracting. In the former case, the extensive reporting requirements embedded in 
the effort have already done that work. The study team has less confidence in the 
completeness of disaster recovery reporting, but undertaking a second systematic 
identification process was beyond the scope of this paper. 
The identification of the crisis-funded dataset makes possible a descriptive analysis 
of what is being contracted for and how. The paper pays special attention to the differences 
between defense and civilian contracting as well as contracts that are performed 
domestically or overseas. OCO contracts are oriented towards the DoD and international 
performance, but not all international DoD contracts are OCO spending; for example, many 
contracts relating to U.S. military bases abroad do not provide direct support to ongoing 
contingency operations. 
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The descriptive analysis is focused on three categories of contract characteristics 
associated with aggravated or mitigated risk: competition, UCAs, and reach-back 
contracting. The aggravating and mitigating characteristics were derived from the literature 
review. Having identified these categories, the study team then posited hypotheses on the 
relationship between crisis contracting and contract performance. The two contract 
performance outcomes examined by this paper are derived from FPDS: contract ceiling 
breaches and terminations. 
The first hypothesis reflects the literature on the risks of crisis-funded contracting and 
examines them collectively: 
H1: Crisis-funded contracts are more likely to experience poor performance. 
The next hypothesis has two parts, both focused on competition. The literature 
suggests that competition reduces the risk of poor performance, while contracts that are not 
competed should have their scope limited and should be subject to additional scrutiny. 
Contracts avoiding competition through use of urgency waivers are singled out in the 
literature as an aggravated instance of this risk. The H2A and H2B seek to evaluate, 
respectively, whether competition mitigates and urgency exceptions aggravate the risk of 
crisis-funded contracts. 
H2A: Increasing (decreasing) competition makes poor contract performance 
less (more) likely for crisis-funded contracts. 
H2B: The use of urgency exception to competition requirements makes poor 
crisis-funded contract performance more likely. 
Similar to urgency waivers, UCAs embody the pressed for time nature of crisis-
funded contracting. UCAs can allow contracting officers to act first and work out the details 
later, which greatly accelerates the contracting process but leaves uncertainty to be 
resolved during implementation. UCAs are thought to be high risk even for conventional 
contracts, and this hypothesis tests whether that risk compounds for crisis-funded contracts. 
H3: The use of UCAs makes poor crisis-funded contract performance more 
likely.  
Finally, crisis-funding contracting can involve a trade-off between employing 
contracting offices that are closest to the action versus those closer to the action. Reach-
back contracting in the strictest sense refers to the practice in the Iraq war of using the 
home base of deployed units to manage some contracts, but this study seeks to test a more 
general version of that idea. 
H4: The use of domestically focused contracting offices makes poor crisis-
funded contract performance less likely. 
Data and Methods 
Data Sources and Structure 
Data Sources  
The principal sources for this paper are FPDS and the DoD budget documents 
published on the comptroller’s website. FPDS includes transaction level detail on U.S 
federal government contracts or task orders with a value of at least $3,500. Prominent 
exceptions to FPDS reporting requirements include classified contracts, the U.S. Postal 
Service, and the Defense Commissary Agency. The study team has created its own copy of 
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FPDS to facilitate analysis, including the creation of derived variables included in this report 
and the collation of variables at the contract and task order level.   
The second primary source is the annual budget documents made available by the 
DoD comptroller. The study team aggregated the treasury funding accounts across each of 
the files to determine what percent of each account in each year was enacted with base 
budget funding versus OCO funding. Starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, these classifications 
were also reliably available for FPDS contracts. Combining these two sources does not 
directly reveal whether a contract or task order is funded by OCO money, but it does at least 
give insight into the larger funding accounts. 
Data Structure  
Each contract in FPDS has a unique procurement identifier, and each task order has 
a unique procurement identifier and a parent contract identifier. This collation allows for the 
creation of the performance variables used in this study, as the study team is interested in 
the entire history of contracts and task orders that experience challenges, not just the 
transaction in question. For brevity, in the remainder of the report, contracts and task orders 
are referred to simply as contracts. 
This paper identifies crisis-funded transactions first as this is a more granular 
dataset, and sometimes a contract may serve both crisis and conventional purposes. After 
identifying the crisis transactions, the paper examines them in the first half of the Results 
section. The second half of the Results section narrows the focus to only those contracts 
with a majority of their obligations going to crisis-funded transactions. This choice reflects 
that contracts may have both conventional and crisis-oriented elements and the research 
question’s orientation towards the latter. 
Identifying Crisis Contracts 
This study involves multiple data sets: contingency contracts, disaster relief, and the 
Recovery Act. For the latter two, CSIS relies on identification work already done by the 
government. This manual classification of contingency contracts is a response to gaps in the 
underlying data. The potential magnitude of this gap is well over $100 billion, as may be 
seen by comparing the magnitude of reporting in FPDS and reporting from other sources. 
From FY2001–2011, transactions directly labeled as contingency contracts accounted for 
less than $30 billion in obligations. For that same period, the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting estimated that the spending on contracts and grants executed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in support of operations in those countries exceeded $206 billion (Thibault & 
Shays, 2011, p. 2).2 
The study team presented a contingency dataset, based on a point scale, at the 
2017 Acquisition Research Symposium in Monterey, CA. Based on conversations after the 
presentation, the study team came to believe that the dataset may have overestimated the 
extent of the drop-off in contingency contracting in 2015 and 2016.3 To increase the 
transparency and robustness of the contingency classification, the study team consulted 




2 This estimate was made before FY2011 was completed. 
3 This feedback included the information that internal DoD reporting does label OCO funding streams 
on a transactional level. The study team was unsuccessful in obtaining that information. 
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display of underlying data at each step of the process. Rather than giving pieces of 
information different weights, the first five steps proceed in order, one criteria at a time. 
Contradictions are resolved in favor of the first criteria, and each subsequent step only 
assigns unlabeled transactions. Already labeled transactions are not reclassified. 
The report still used a scoring system within the decision tree. This paper also 
updates the ways in which these scores are used, applying the measures directly rather 
than grouping them into bands to translate them into points (for example, 4 points for a 
transaction taking place in Iraq, 0 points for one domestically).  
Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Output and Study Variables 
The study employs two different output variables, both derived from FPDS and listed 
in Table 1. These variables were first employed, and are described in greater length, in prior 
work of the study team focusing on fixed-price contracts (Sanders et al., 2015). Terminations 
is measured using a binary variable that has a value of 1 for any contracts that have 
experienced a partial or complete termination, 0 otherwise. FPDS does not differentiate 
between complete and partial terminations, so this can include both a canceled program and 
a contract that was completed after being initially protested and reassigned. 0.81% of 
contracts have experienced at least one partial or complete termination, and those records 
account for about 4.32% of obligations in the dataset. Ceiling Breaches is likewise 
measured as a binary variable with a value of 1 for any contracts that have experienced a 
ceiling breach, 0 otherwise. While only 1.19% of contracts have experienced a ceiling 
breach, the total obligations of those entries account for about 19.5% of obligations in the 
dataset. In addition, a slim fraction of terminations overlap with ceiling breaches, despite 
both accounting for a similar percentage of contracts and task orders. 
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Table 1. Output and Study Variables 
 
The study variables, also listed in Table 1, cover competition, UCAs, and contracting 
office place of performance. The measure of competition separates urgency exceptions from 
other reasons not to compete contracts and divides competed contracts by the number of 
offers. While Urgency exceptions received significant attention in the literature, they are 
notably rare, making up only 0.87% of contracts, and the obligation they account for is 
similarly small at 1.3%. The measure for UCA is a binary variable that tracks whether a 
contract started as a UCA. Like urgency exceptions, UCAs are rare and account for a tiny 
proportion (around 0.5%) of contracts and only 2.9% of obligations. As an unfortunate side 
effect of a changeover in the name of the relevant column, UCA classification is missing for 
nearly 8% of records and 8.2% of obligations in the dataset. Nonetheless, the importance 
the literature places on this variable merits inclusion. 
Specifically identifying reach-back contracts is analytically challenging. There are 
thousands of contracting offices, and the descriptors and surrounding data are often arcane. 
This study uses two different proxies. Frist, the project looked at what percentage of a 
contracting office’s obligations go to officially labeled contingency contracts—a measure 
also used when producing the OCO contracting score. Second, the study team created a 
categorical variable used in this study that divides contracting offices into three categories 
based on the percentage of a contracting office’s obligations that go to international 
contracts: domestic offices with less than 1% of their obligations internationally, mixed 
offices with at least 1% but less than 50% of their obligations internationally, and 
international offices with 50% or more internationally. For the purposes of this study, 
domestic and mixed contracting offices have sufficiently varied portfolios to be a reasonable 
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proxy for Reach-Back contracting, even if they form a far broader category than the Reach-
Back division specifically. 
Empirical Approach 
This paper explores the dataset using two different empirical approaches. First, the 
three crisis-funded transactions are graphed along with four comparison groups. The 
comparison groups consist of other transactions during the 2007 to 2015 period divided by 
whether they are defense and civilian and whether they took place in the United States or 
abroad.  
The second approach involves creating models that estimate the likelihood of ceiling 
breaches and termination. Each outcome is modeled using both a sample of one million 
federal contracts and the complete dataset of contracts that have at least 50% of their 
obligations classified as crisis-funded according to the decision tree criteria. The use of both 
a federal and a crisis dataset allows comparison between what is typical for all contracts 
versus crisis contracts in particular, which is key to evaluating the study’s hypotheses. The 
choice of a logistic model is driven by the binary representation of the study outputs. Given 
the rarity of these negative outcomes, the study team chose to focus on when they occur 
and not differences in magnitude. The multilevel approach introduces second and third level 
variables, shown in Table 5 in Appendix B: Presentation of the Estimating Equation, which 
approximates that different categories of what is being bought, who is buying it, where it is 
being performed, and when the contract was signed may each have different innate 
challenges. The multilevel approach allows for separate intercepts for each value of each of 
the characteristics listed in Table 5. 
Results 
Extent and Characteristics of Crisis Contracting 
All three datasets exhibit considerable volatility over time, as shown in Figure 1, 
though the patterns are different depending on the kind of crisis fund. For OCO, the jump 
between 2010 and 2011 reflects newly available contract funding data.4 From 2012 and 
after, funding accounts are reliably labeled, and spending declines from $40.6 billion and 
$35.5 billion in 2012 and 2013 to between $14.0 billion and $16.6 billion in the last three 
years of the sample. While international OCO spending began a steady decline after 2013, 
domestic OCO spending has been much more volatile, with peaks of $5.0 billion, $8.2 
billion, and $4.6 billion in 2011, 2014, and 2016, while staying at or below $3.1 billion for 
every other year in the sample. That said, it is still notable that there was still a floor of over 
$10 billion a year in international OCO spending from 2014–2017 in addition to highly 




4 See Figure 12 for a demonstration of how the funding account data aids in the identification of OCO 
accounts. 
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Figure 1. Contracts Obligations by Crisis-Funding Category 
The Recovery Act was passed on February 17, 2009, and roughly half the 
obligations, $18.9 billion out of $40.8 billion, under the act were made in the six and a half 
months remaining in that fiscal year. The variation in disaster spending likely reflects both 
high profile recovery efforts and variable quality in data labeling. The three largest years for 
obligations occur in 2005, 2006, and 2007, $5.4 billion, $14.3 billion, and $4.3 billion, 
respectively, with only 2007 included in the sample.  
Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005, near the end of the fiscal year, and the vast 
majority of the mid-decade spike in spending relates to recovering from that disaster. The 
recovery efforts were long lasting, including nearly 79% of obligations in 2007 and over 30% 
of obligations in 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2016!5 For most of the disaster spending after 2007 
in greater detail, and in most cases the obligations are split over multiple years. For 
example, the second biggest disaster is Hurricane Sandy, with $1.5 billion in obligations in 
2013, another nearly $0.7 billion in 2014, and a bit under $0.45 billion in 2015. The majority 
of the disasters reported, including all with $1 billion or more in obligations, spent less than 
two-thirds of their obligations in their peak year.6 
Competition 
To examine crisis-funded contracting’s employment of competition, UCA, and reach 




5 Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts also had an outsized influence on 2010, which included a net 
$142 million deobligation of funds. 
6 Hurricane Harvey may prove an exception to this rule, with $932 million in 2017 spending, 
depending on how much is obligated to recovery efforts in 2018. 
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comparison groups. These four groups, the right four columns in Figure 2, split the non-crisis 
contracts by whether they were defense or civilian and whether they were performed 
internationally or domestically. This comparison is intended to ease like-to-like comparisons, 
for example, between OCO and other international defense contracts or the Recovery Act 
and other U.S. civilian contracts. 
 
Figure 2. Competition by Crisis-Funding Category 
As shown in Figure 2, OCO and Recovery Act obligations achieve robust levels of 
multi-offer competition, 67.2% and 78.1%, respectively. The Recovery Act rate is 20 
percentage points in excess of other U.S. civilian contracts at 58.0%. The OCO rate is 
roughly in line with the 66.3% multi-offer competition rate for other international defense 
contracting and more than 21 percentage points in excess of the 45.8% other U.S. domestic 
rate. Disaster contracting has a 60.6% multi-offer competition rate, which is in line with the 
aforementioned rate for other civilian contracts but below competition rates for civilian and 
defense international contracting. For competition with 5 or more offers, ARRA, OCO, and 
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other international defense lead the pack at 33.5, 34.7, and 30.7, respectively, well above 
the other samples. 
Use of Urgency exceptions is rare across the board, but disaster contracting makes 
the greatest use at 3% of obligation, roughly twice the employment in any other category, 
with OCO and Other International Defense contracting trailing in their usage at 1.8 and 1.5% 
of obligations, respectively. 
 
Figure 3. Contracts Obligations by Crisis-Funding Category 
As shown in Figure 3, the trends over time for competition in crisis-funded contracts 
do not tell a single clear-cut story. The change in OCO from 2010 was driven by an 
enhanced ability to label crisis contracts beyond Afghanistan and Iraq rather than a change 
in competition policy. The $10 billion increase in competition with five or more offers from 
2010 to 2011 is striking and sustained through 2014, but a change in composition does not 
imply a strong change in policy. Another trend during that period does reflect trends in the 
DoD as a whole, namely a precipitous decline in competition that receives only a single offer 
(McCormick et al., 2017). In 2011, contracts competed and receiving only one offer received 
$5.0 billion in OCO obligations, but from 2015 to 2017, they received less than $1 billion 
each year. This trend does not extend to disaster contracting, where single offer competition 
bottomed out in percentage and absolute terms in 2011 at only 3% of obligations versus 
over 20% of obligations in both 2016 and 2017. Likewise, OCO and Disaster contracts have 
different trends in the use of the Urgency exception. Except for a low year in 2010 (at 0.7%), 
obligations to OCO contracts employing the urgency exception have a share of 1.25 to 
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2.5%. For disaster contracts, the usage rate is far more variable, with net obligations not 
exceeding $0 in four years but accounting for over one in 20 disaster obligation dollars in 
another four years. Those peaks were 2008, 2010, 2013, and 2014 (6.1, 10.9, 6.5, and 
5.2%, respectively), with 2017 coming in close to the average in Figure 2 with 3.1% of 
disaster obligations employing the urgency exception. 
Undefinitized Contract Actions 
 
Figure 4. Frequency of Undefinitized Contract Action 
UCA contracts were used in disaster recovery and under the Recovery Act at rates 
of 4.6 and 2.8%, respectively, notably higher than for U.S. civilian contracting. As shown in 
Figure 4, the obligation rate for disaster recovery is even higher than it is for domestic 
defense spending, where they are sometimes used for high value Major Defense Acquisition 
Projects. OCO contracts diverge in the other direction, with UCAs only accounting for 1.2% 
of obligations, less than half of the rate for international defense contracts and even a 
smidge lower than international civilian ones. 
The high rate of unlabeled obligations can be traced to missing data from the 
USAspending.gov system, which stemmed from the study team discovering an 
unsuccessfully managed change in the name of the relevant field in the later years of the 
study period. The proportion of unlabeled contracts is smallest for the Recovery Act, whose 
spending largely preceded the data glitch. As an unfortunate side effect of the problem, it is 
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difficult to judge what, if any, trends are present in the rate of UCA usage for crisis contracts 
over time.7 
Reach-Back Contracting 
The study team lacked reliable location information for many of the contract 
obligations in the dataset, and so classified contracting offices based on the proportion of 
their obligations performed domestically versus internationally. The three categories are 
shown Figure 5, dividing contracting offices between those with a 99% share or greater 
performed domestically, mixed offices with between 1% and 50% performed internationally, 
and internationally oriented offices with more than 50% of their obligations performed 
abroad. That middle category, depicted in light green, is the study’s operationalization of 
reach-back offices, ones which do at least half of their work domestically but also have 
provided significant overseas support. 
 
Figure 5. Contracting Offices’ Focus over Time for Selected Countries 
The divisions by contracting office are clear-cut. Internationally oriented offices do 
little taking place domestically and vice versa. The data show that civilian contracting 
performed abroad relies more on internationally focused contracting offices than mixed 
ones. This is especially true in countries associated with OCO-funding: mixed offices only 




7 At the time of the completion of this report, the study team is in the process of integrating 
USAspending.gov data, which was updated during 2018, with historical data. The new data handles 
funding accounts in ways that are intended to improve fidelity but require additional steps to integrate, 
which is a challenge for the methodology used in this report. In a positive change, the updated 
dataset has resolved the UCA labeling issue, and pending successful integration of the new data, the 
study team will offer an updated version of the dataset but does not intend to rerun the models. 
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countries on the OCO list (95.8%). By comparison, Defense reach-back contracting’s low 
point is 13.9% of obligations in 2005 and has remained above 40% of obligations from 2012 
onwards. For other countries on the OCO list, the obligation share of mixed contracting 
office usage is even higher, only dipping below 40% in 2004 and 2007 at 33.6% and 39.0%, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 6. Obligations by Place of Performance 
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The breakdown by country shown in Figure 6 provides additional granularity. Mixed 
international and domestic offices are an imprecise proxy for reach-back contracting, as 
shown by the significant mixed office spending in Kuwait before the 2007 debut of the reach-
back office. Likewise, the 2009 $1.0 billion jump in mixed contracting office obligations in 
Kuwait was followed by a larger decrease in Iraq the next year. Nonetheless, comparing Iraq 
and Afghanistan does show a genuine shift towards mixed offices. Iraq’s use of those offices 
peaked at $4.0 billion in 2004, while Afghanistan surpassed that value from 2011 to 2013 
with a peak at $9.9 billion in mixed office obligations in 2012.  
Finally, the 2011 jump in mixed office crisis spending in South Korea and the rest of 
the world can likely be attributed to the improved labeling available do the addition of 
funding account data.  
Contract Performance Model 
To analyze performance, the study team switches from the transactions and 
obligations to using contracts as the unit of analysis. The full estimation results depicted in 
Table 7 (found in Appendix C: Logit Model Results) are based on whether each contract 
experienced a ceiling breach or termination. This measure is made across two different 
samples, first a federal-wide sample that includes 1 million contracts chosen at random from 
throughout the federal government during the study period. Second, the model is run over a 
crisis-only sample made up of the population of identified crisis contracts during the study 
period. The relative scarcity means that this sample is smaller and consists of only 347,000 
contracts. The results for both models are presented in odds ratio format, a way of 
transforming logistic model results that better translates them into outcomes.  
An odds ratio of 1.00 means that the variable in question does not have a 
measurable effect on the likelihood of ceiling breaches or terminations. An odds ratio of 
greater than one indicates an increased likelihood, with a ratio of 2.0 meaning twice as 
likely. For example, if an odds ratio was above 1, then the odds would be multiplied by the 
odds ratio if the binary or categorical variable was true relative to the baseline (e.g., ceiling 
breaches would be 1.73 times as likely in the Federal model version of Table 2 if a UCA was 
present versus the baseline of not UCA). If the ratio was below 1.00, then the variable was 
associated with reduced likelihood relative to the baseline (e.g., ceiling breaches would only 
be 0.94 times as likely in the Federal model version of Table 2 if a contract was competed 
but only received one offer versus the baseline of competition with two to four offers). 
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Table 2. Ceiling Breach Odds Ratios 
 
In the federal ceiling breach model, OCO contracts were not associated with a 
greater risk of terminations, but Recovery Act contracts were estimated to be 2.18 times 
more likely, and Disaster contracts were estimated to be 1.41 times more likely (significant 
at the 0.1% and 1% levels, respectively). In the crisis-only model, both were more likely to 
have a breach relative to OCO contracting, although the magnitude of the difference was 
smaller. The results for competition in the crisis-only model did show that breaches were 
1.44 times more likely for contracts competed with the urgency exception and 0.78 times 
less likely to experience breaches when competed with five or more offers (significant at the 
0.1% level in both cases). For UCA, the trend went the other direction, with no significant 
results in the crisis funding model, but ceiling breaches being an estimated 1.73 times more 
likely in the federal model. There were no reach-back contracting results of note. 
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Table 3. Terminations Odds Ratios 
(FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
 
For terminations, there were no significant correlations between any category of 
crisis contracting and termination rates. For competition, uncompleted contracts that did not 
use the urgency exception, contract to expectation, had significantly fewer terminations. 
That said, contracts competed with five or more offers were more likely to be terminated in 
overall federal contracts but had no significant relationship with crisis contracts. As with 
ceiling breaches, UCA terminations were much more likely for the federal model (2.16 times, 
significant at the 0.1 level), but not more likely for the crisis only model. For reach-back 
contracts, those using international offices were less likely to be terminated than those using 
domestic offices, contrary to expectations. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
What Are the Trends in Crisis-Funded Contracts Since the End of the Iraq War? 
One of the larger drivers of the decline in crisis contracting shown in Figure 1 has 
been the continued reduction in contract spending, first due to the withdrawal from Iraq and 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 19 - 
then, to a lesser degree, reinforced as the footprint of U.S. operations in Afghanistan was 
reduced. OCO spending has not gone away during this period, and U.S. operations in Iraq 
have resumed.  
The wind-down of the Recovery Act was always planned, but natural disasters have 
not become less intense in intervening years. The reduction in disaster spending may be 
attributable to increasing utilization of grants and other mechanisms, or it may be because of 
a drop-off in diligence in labeling. The biggest unexpected trend is the relative stability of 
contingency contract funding through civilian agencies. This is predominantly driven by 
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is nonetheless remarkable that despite military 
drawdown, civilian activity has been comparatively stable. 
How Reliable Is the Reporting on Crisis-Funded Contracts? 
Furthermore, fields that track contingency operations, humanitarian operations, and 
other national interest codes would be of far greater value to researchers, practitioners, and 
overseers if reliably filled out. Transactions caught by one classification are routinely ignored 
by others. Moreover, a great deal of the contracting performed in Afghanistan and Iraq 
caught none of those fields meant to capture contingency contracts. Another value of the 
dataset made available by this study is that researchers who wish to focus on studying 
rather than identifying contingency contracts may make unrestricted use of the work of this 
paper and further the study of these important contracts. By comparison, the Recovery Act 
data is most straightforward to interpret, and the totals align with inspector general reporting 
in a way that is not true for contingency contracts. 
This research provides additional evidence of the increasing divergence between the 
spending on OCO budget accounts and related contingency contracts. The withdrawal from 
Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan may be revealing that a growing portion of OCO 
funding might be base funding in disguise. While the decline in contingency contracting 
spending does seem to have stabilized above $10 billion annually, this still represents a 
notable decline. The DoD internally tracks OCO funding of contracts in ways that are not 
included in the FPDS. More rigorous use of the fields that the study team relies on in the 
decision tree would be one means to improve transparency and accountability of these 
funds.  
What Methods Do Contracting Officers Employ for Crisis Funded Contracts? 
As detailed in the results, crisis funded contracts often eschewed UCAs and 
achieved high levels of competition. This does not mean that there is not room for potential 
progress, but public servants have already clearly heard about the risks of uncompleted 
contracts and UCAs documented in the literature and are responding accordingly. Likewise, 
the comparatively low termination rates among non-competed and UCA contracts suggests 
that contracting officers are being conservative when employing those tools.  
Analysis of competition trends within the contingency datasets, shown in Figure 2, 
confirms findings from the literature review. 
Is the Importance of Competition Different for Crisis Funded Contracting?  
Much of the literature focused specifically on the urgency exception because it is 
specific to crisis-funded contracts. In keeping with this, Recovery Act contracts relied on 
different waivers than conventional contracts and made less use of the “only one source” 
exception. However, disaster and contingency contracts, when not competing, did not make 
disproportionate use of less common waivers. Furthermore, both UCA and non-competed 
contracts proved to have lower termination rates. This suggests that the highest risk 
contracts may not be those that rely on special statutory exceptions available for crisis 
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contracting. Risk-based audits should therefore consider a broader range of contract 
characteristics when selecting which contracts merit a closer look. The datasets generated 
in this study are available to other researchers and practitioners in part to aid them in further 
developing such criteria. 
This is not to say that there is no room for further reduction of non-competitive 
awards, including using the no competition wavier, but in both the OCO dataset and the 
disaster dataset, contracts were most likely to go uncompleted because of the use of the 
only one source exception. Only for the Recovery Act did a majority of non-competitive 
awards go to “no competition (other),” although its 5.7% rate is still lower than that of any of 
the comparison groups. 
Contingency, disaster response, and Recovery Act contracts were competed at 
greater rates than conventional. Of the three datasets, disaster contracting made the 
greatest use of non-competitive awards and had the highest level of single-offer competition. 
The hypothesis that non-competed contracts would be at greater risk was not proven by the 
termination measure, as competed contracts were regularly terminated at higher rates. Also, 
both the disaster and the contingency datasets did not appear to make disproportionately 
heavy use of urgency waivers when compared to conventional contracting. 
Based on the ceiling breach model, this concern about Urgency exceptions and 
emphasis on competition does seem to be at least partially justified. Contracts that were 
sole source with an urgency exception performed worse for crisis contracts than for overall 
federal contracting. Similarly, crisis contracts that were competed and received five or more 
offers improved performance for crisis contracts with a contrary relationship present for 
overall federal contracting. As a caveat, contracts that were sole source with another waiver 
fared slightly better than those competed with two to four offers for both the federal and 
crisis model. 
Are UCA Contracts More Risky for Crisis Funded Contracts? 
Strikingly, the answer appears to be no. UCA contracts were associated with 
significant risks of ceiling breach and terminations in the federal model.  
How Does Reach-Back Contracting Correlate with Contract Performance? 
In the aggregate, there do not appear to be stronger results with reach-back 
contracting in either the termination or ceiling breach models. That said, closer examination 
of individual country results are possible under the model and may be an illuminated topic 
for future research. 
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Appendix A: Other Input Variables 
The study also includes other contract characteristics that were not identified in the 
literature review as being critical to crisis contracting, but that are nonetheless important. 
They were initially developed by Gregory Sanders and Zachary Huitink (2019) and are 
described in greater detail there. 




In three cases, the study team transformed variables to ease interpretation. Starting 
with linear transformations, the percent of contracting office obligations formally labeled as 
going to crisis-funding, c_OffCri, is rescaled by subtracting its mean and then dividing by 
twice its standard deviation. This rescaling is done to ease comparison between it and the 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 22 - 
binary variables included in this study. Table 5 shows the pre-transformation mean, two 
standard deviations below, and two standard deviations above, corresponding to c_OffCri 
values of 0, -1, and 1 respectively. 
Table 5. Statistical Summary for Transformed Variables 
 
Two other variables, initial cost ceiling and duration, are measured in dollars 
obligated and days, respectively. Duration is capped at 10 years, but no cap is imposed on 
contract ceiling, which includes an absurdly value listed in Table 5. Both variables are 
transformed by taking the natural log and then rescaled, again by subtracting their 
respective mean and dividing by their respective standard deviation. Logarithmic 
transformation was chosen due to the range between the minimum and maximum values of 
these variables. Shown in Table 5 are the original values of the logarithmic mean, two 
standard deviations below, and two standard deviations above, corresponding to OffCri 
values of 0, -1, and 1 respectively. 
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Appendix B:  Presentation of the Estimating Equation 
Table 6. Level 2 and Level 3 Variables Included in the Model 
 
To create the model, the study team employed a mix of the modeling technique 
recommended by Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill (2007) and the technique recommended 
by Nicolas Sommet and Davide Morselli (2017). While the variables chosen for inclusion and 
the datasets are different, much of the groundwork for this approach was first published in 
the study team’s prior work investigating industrial consolidation (Sanders & Huitink, 2019, 
pp. 29–31).  
For estimating the probability of ceiling breaches for the sample of 1 million federal 
contracts, the study team used the following model (subscript 𝑖𝑖 refers to the individual 
contract, while subscript 𝑗𝑗 refers to the product or service area, subscript k refers to product 
or service code, subscript l refers to contracting customer, subscript m refers to contracting 
office, subscript o refers to country of performance, and subscript n refers to calendar year 
for those equations that include it). The model for crisis-funded contracts differs only in the 
number of groups, as covered in Table 6 and in the omission of the 𝛽𝛽9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 variable. In the 
crisis-funded version of this equation, there are no non-crisis funded contracts, and 
therefore OCO contracts become the new baseline. 
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Equation 1. Ceiling Breaches 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜 𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵ℎ (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1 )  
=  𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 �𝛼𝛼 + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗[𝑖𝑖]
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘[𝑖𝑖]𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  +  𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙[𝑖𝑖]𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶[𝑖𝑖[
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛[𝑖𝑖]𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃[𝑖𝑖]𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1 𝑖𝑖
+  𝛽𝛽4𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃_𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽7𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 
+  𝛽𝛽8𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽10𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃_𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃_𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽15𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽16𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈 − 𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  
+  𝛽𝛽17𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽18𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽19𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃
− 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
+  𝛽𝛽21𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝑃_𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃_𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝑃_𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃_𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽23𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃_𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽24𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃_𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
+  𝛽𝛽21𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝑃_𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝑃_𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽23𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃_𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽24𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃_𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖� ,          𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 1,000,000 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑗𝑗 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 17 
𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑘𝑘 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2,598 
𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 9 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 4,166 
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼, + 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 199 
𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 9 
This paper uses largely the same equation for estimating the probability of 
terminations for the sample of 1 million federal contracts. Equation 2 does not include the 
level 2 variable year because it had an inter-class coefficient of zero, which suggests that it 
has no measurable influence on the outcome. The model also has one addition; the office 
crisis percentage is only included in the termination model because the measures employed 
during model building suggested that it added nothing to the ceiling breach model. As with 
ceiling breaches, the crisis-funded dataset version of this model uses 𝛽𝛽9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 as a baseline 
rather than including it as a variable and has fewer elements in most groups, as covered in 
Table 6. 
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Equation 2. Terminations 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1 )   
=  𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 �𝛼𝛼 + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗[𝑖𝑖]
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘[𝑖𝑖]𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  + 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙[𝑖𝑖]𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶[𝑖𝑖[
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛[𝑖𝑖]𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴
+  𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1 𝑖𝑖
+  𝛽𝛽4𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃_𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 
+  𝛽𝛽8𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽10𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃_𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃_𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽13𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽15𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽16𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈 − 𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  
+  𝛽𝛽17𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽18𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽19𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃
− 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖� ,          𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖
= 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 1,000,000 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑗𝑗 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 17 
𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑘𝑘 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2,598 
𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 9 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 4,166 
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,,𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴2), 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶 = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 199 
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(Intercept) -4.87 (0.28)*** -4.77 (0.33)
*** -5.79 (0.23)*** -5.55 (0.20)*** 
Study Variables     
     No Comp, Urgency 0.15 (0.11) 0.36 (0.11)*** -0.23 (0.14)· 0.18 (0.15) 
     No Comp, Other 0.01 (0.03) -0.12 (0.05)* -0.38 (0.04)*** -0.56 (0.07)*** 
     Comp=1 offer -0.07 (0.04)· -0.25 (0.05)
*** -0.35 (0.04)*** -0.43 (0.07)*** 
     Comp=5+ offers 0.12 (0.04)** -0.35 (0.06)
*** 0.25 (0.03)*** 0.05 (0.05) 
     UCA 0.55 (0.07)*** 0.02 (0.08) 0.77 (0.09)
*** -0.00 (0.21) 
     Cont. Office Crisis %   0.05 (0.03)· 0.07 (0.03)* 
     Cont. Office 1-50% Intl. 0.04 (0.07) 0.27 (0.17) 0.11 (0.07) -0.09 (0.32) 
     Cont. Office 50%+ Intl. 0.16 (0.15) 0.12 (0.23) -0.51 (0.21)* -0.49 (0.28)· 
Crisis Category     
     Crisis=OCO 0.12 (0.10)  0.08 (0.13)  
     Crisis=Recovery Act 0.78 (0.08)*** 0.36 (0.07)
*** -0.23 (0.21) -0.08 (0.12) 
     Crisis=Disaster Relief 0.34 (0.15)* 0.23 (0.08)
** 0.38 (0.26) -0.07 (0.13) 
Contract Characteristics     
     Log(Init. Ceiling) 1.50 (0.04)*** 1.40 (0.05)
*** 0.54 (0.04)*** 0.87 (0.06)*** 
     Log(Init. Days) 0.41 (0.02)*** 0.46 (0.03)
*** 0.82 (0.04)*** 0.80 (0.05)*** 
     Vehicle=S-IDC -0.40 (0.03)*** -0.42 (0.04)
*** -0.68 (0.04)*** -0.74 (0.07)*** 
     Vehicle=M-IDC -0.05 (0.03) 0.20 (0.04)
*** -0.59 (0.06)*** -0.30 (0.08)*** 
     Vehicle=FSS/GWAC -0.04 (0.03) -0.32 (0.07)
*** -0.20 (0.04)*** -0.23 (0.12)· 
     Vehicle=BPA/BOA -0.29 (0.05)*** -0.11 (0.06)
· -0.61 (0.06)*** -0.26 (0.12)* 
     Pricing=Other FP -0.38 (0.06)*** -0.55 (0.18)
** -0.44 (0.05)*** -1.02 (0.09)*** 
     Pricing=Incentive Fee 0.95 (0.17)*** 0.91 (0.30)
** 0.04 (0.29) 0.36 (0.79) 
     Pricing=Combination or Other 0.45 (0.09)*** 0.09 (0.21) -0.24 (0.17) -0.06 (0.33) 
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     Pricing=Other CB 0.14 (0.07)· -0.02 (0.11) -0.21 (0.13) 0.45 (0.15)
** 
     Pricing=T&M/LH/FP:LoE 0.24 (0.06)*** -0.19 (0.11)
· -0.43 (0.12)*** -0.11 (0.16) 
Interactions     




*   
     No Comp, Other:Log(Init. Ceiling) -0.19 (0.06)*** -0.05 (0.08) 
  
     Comp=1 offer:Log(Init. Ceiling) -0.12 (0.07)· -0.01 (0.08) 
  
     Comp=5+ offers:Log(Init. Ceiling) -0.04 (0.06) 0.48 (0.08)
***   
AIC 111726.14 65160.66 87051.85 31011.00 
BIC 112163.31 65547.97 87441.76 31355.28 
Log Likelihood -55826.07 -32544.33 -43492.92 -15473.50 
Num. obs. 1000000 347563 1000000 347563 




0.22 0.36 0.18 0.35 
Var: PlaceCountryISO3 
OffPlaceUS99 0.12 0.15 0.46 0.66 
Var: PlaceCountryISO3 
OffPlaceMixed 0.18 0.16 0.64 0.85 




0.15 0.09 0.54 -0.75 
Cov: PlaceCountryISO3 
OffPlaceUS99 OffPlaceIntl 0.08 -0.07 0.08 -0.04 
Cov: PlaceCountryISO3 
OffPlaceMixed OffPlaceIntl 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.00 
Var: CrisisProductOrServiceArea 
(Intercept) 0.27 0.17 0.08 0.00 
Var: StartFY (Intercept) 0.00 0.00   
Var: Customer (Intercept) 0.44 0.53 0.16 0.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1. Logged inputs are 
rescaled. 
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Appendix D: Model Diagnostics 
 
Figure 7. Fitted and Residual Plots for Ceiling Breaches 
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